A sequence of recent studies show that even in the simple setting of a single seller and a single buyer with additive, independent valuations over m items, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is prohibitively complex. This problem has been addressed using two main approaches:
two main approaches have been taken with respect to this challenge, both of which proposed simple mechanisms and measured their performance against the theoretic optimum:
The first line of work approaches this problem through the lens of approximation [1, 2, 6, 8-12, 18, 21, 26, 27, 29, 34-36] . In particular, the breakthrough result of [1] shows that the better of two simple mechanisms -selling each item separately or selling all items together in a grand bundle -obtains at least 1/6 (but at most 1/2 [33] ) of the optimal revenue.
The second approach is to enhance the competition for the merchandise by increasing the population of potential buyers [4, 17, 28, 32] . This approach is often termed resource augmentatation in computer science. The state of the art for additive buyers is by Eden et al. [17] , who showed that adding m additional buyers is sufficient to recover the original optimal revenue with a simple mechanism. It is also known that at least Ω(log m) additional buyers are required to achieve this benchmark. This result from [17] generalizes the seminal work of Bulow and Klemperer [4] who showed that for a market with a single item, under a regularity assumption, running the second price auction with one additional buyer extracts at least as much revenue as the original optimal revenue. However, when m is large, adding m additional buyers may be prohibitive. We therefore believe that the most interesting question here is whether the linear dependence on m is necessary.
To summarize, the "optimal" benchmark is intractable. The approximation approach is stuck at a 1/6-approximation (forfeiting 83% of potential revenue). And if we wish to follow the enhanced competition approach, the best known bound on the number of additional buyers is linear in the number of items.
Our Contribution
We show that one can combine the two approaches (of approximation and enhanced competition) in a way that achieves the best of both worlds. We establish a host of results for various settings, but they all convey one theme: in order to obtain revenue that is very close to optimum, there is no need to recruit a linear number (in m) of additional buyers; that is:
Main take away (informal): A seller can obtain 99% of the optimal revenue in a simple mechanism (selling each item separately or selling all items together in a singe bundle) with substantially fewer additional buyers -logarithmic (in m), constant, or even none in some cases.
The constant 99% above is arbitrary of course. More generally, we show what we think of as the mechanism-design analog of computational PTAS: an efficient mechanism that obtains a (1 − ε)-approximation, for any constant ε > 0 (where in our case efficient means "few additional buyers" instead of "polynomial time").
All of our results apply to the paradigmatic scenario of a seller who sells m items to a single buyer with additive, independent valuations over the items, with a known prior. Some of our results extend to the more general scenario of n i.i.d. buyers, namely where buyers' values are drawn independently according to the same distribution. The induced product distribution is then denoted by D. Our first set of results consider the simple mechanism that sells each item separately.
increase the number of buyers by a factor of O (log(2 + m/n)), and this is tight up to constant factors. Moreover, if m = o(n), then selling each item separately achieves (1 −ε)-fraction of the optimal revenue even with no additional buyers. Theorem 1.2 essentially fully characterizes (up to constant factors) the number of additional buyers necessary for achieving (1 − ε) of the optimal revenue. In particular, we consider three different regimes of m and n: For m = ω (n) we prove that increasing the number of buyers by a factor of O (log(m/n)) is both necessary (Theorem 4.12) and sufficient (Theorem 4.1). For m = Θ(n), our new lower bound implies that the previous results of [17] (who showed that a linear number of additional buyer suffice) are essentially tight. Finally, for m = o(n), we show that no additional buyers are necessary (Theorem 5.1). We note that our lower bound generalizes the special case of Ω(log m)-factor for the case of a single buyer in [17] 2 .
Let us return to the single buyer setting. Theorem 1.2 implies that we can recover (1 − ε )-fraction of the optimal revenue by adding O (log m) buyers. However, one may argue that for a large value of m, O (log m) is still too large. We address this issue by showing that the better of selling items separately and selling the grand bundle requires only a constant number of additional buyers 3 . Theorem 1.3. For every constant ε > 0, the better of selling each item separately and selling the grand bundle, to a constant number of i.i.d. buyers, extracts at least (1 − ε)-fraction of the optimal revenue achievable from one buyer.
Up until now, we concentrated on prior-dependent mechanisms; namely, mechanisms that use the knowledge of the distribution of values. Our work, however, contributes also to the literature on prior-independent mechanisms. As in previous literature on prior-independent mechanisms, to achieve any meaningful result, we assume that the underlying single-dimensional distributions are regular (note that this does not generally imply regularity of the grand bundle's distribution). Since bidders are additive, the prior-independent VCG mechanism simply runs the second price auction for each item simultaneously. Thus, Theorem 1.2 combined with the original result of Bulow and Klemperer [4] immediately implies the following corollary: Corollary 1.4. If D is a product of regular distributions, then for every constant ε > 0, running the VCG mechanism with a factor O (log(2 + m/n)) increase in the number of buyers (and with no additional buyers in the case of m = o(n)) extracts at least (1 − ε)-fraction of the original optimal revenue.
It would be highly desirable to obtain such an analog to Theorem 1.3. An immediate barrier, however, is that the seller must know in advance whether to sell the items separately or sell the grand bundle. How can the seller determine which one of these mechanisms to run in the absence of a prior? This barrier is overcome by the surprising result that when D is a product of regular distributions, the seller never needs to sell items separately; selling the grand bundle is always the "correct" strategy: Theorem 1.5. If D is a product of regular distributions, then for every constant ε > 0, selling the grand bundle in a second price auction to a constant number of i.i.d. additive buyers extracts at least (1 − ε)-fraction of the optimal revenue achievable from one buyer. 2 The lower bound in [17] was proven for mechanisms that target 100% of the optimal revenue, but it can be easily extended to mechanisms that target 99% or any constant fraction. 3 There is no contradiction to the Ω(log m) lower bound, which applies only for selling items separately. 
The Case for 99% AGT
Constant factor approximations, and the heavy use of asymptotics in general, are one of the distinctive characteristics of Algorithmic Game Theory (in contrast to "standard" Economics), and we are by no means innocent. Note that in all our theorem statements hidden constants are lurking, and we do not even attempt to explicitly state them (obtaining reasonable constants remains an interesting open problem). We hope, as we always do when we make such asymptotic analysis, that our mathematically precise models tell an insightful story about how our guarantees degrade when we extend our single item / neighborhood grocery store intuition to auctioneers selling a huge number of items 4 , especially online. (And this goes without mentioning our "standard" but absurd assumptions: rational bidders, independent valuation distributions, etc.) That being said, we argue that some constants are more important than others, and constant factor approximation of the revenue are particularly problematic. Consider the 1/6-approximation by [1] . This is an extremely interesting result, but ultimately, losing 83% (or even the most optimistic 50%) of the revenue doesn't actually solve the auctioneer's mechanism problem 5 . On the other hand, a seller might be willing to compromise on optimality if guaranteed 99% of the optimal revenue. (For example, merchants around the world pay small fees to credit card companies in return for simple selling mechanisms). We therefore argue that in general the most interesting agenda, in 99% of mechanism design problems, should be obtaining 99% of the optimal revenue.
Relation to work on approximate revenue maximization
As already mentioned, our work is related to and inspired by a long line of research that aims at understanding what fraction of the optimal revenue can be guaranteed with simple mechanisms (without adding buyers), including [1, 20, 27] and references therein. It is interesting to note that obtaining a 0.99-approximation to the optimal revenue with k additional buyers has implications on approximation results without additional buyers. In particular, if one can obtain a 0.99-approximation to the optimal revenue using mechanism M with k additional buyers, then, by revenue submodularity, this immediately implies a 0.99/(k + 1)-approximation of the optimal revenue with a single buyer. Hence, our Theorem 1.1 implies the result of [27] that selling each item separately is an Ω(1/ log m)-approximation of the optimal revenue. Similarly, our Theorem 1.3 implies the main result of [1] that the better of selling separately and selling the grand bundle yields a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Of course, the reverse implication is not true, since the seller only has a single copy of each item to allocate to all buyers. Therefore, while our analysis builds on the techniques of [1, 27] , it is significantly more challenging.
Recently, Goldner and Karlin [20] built on the result of Babaioff et al. [1] , and showed that for regular distributions, the prior-independent mechanism which sells either each item separately or the grand bundle, and sets the price according to a single sample from the valuations distribution, obtains a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. As a corollary of our Theorem 1.5, we can obtain the following qualitative strengthening of [20, Corollary 2] for the case of a single buyer: Corollary 1.6. If D is a product of regular distributions, taking a single sample of the value of the grand bundle and selling the grand bundle for that price (to a single buyer) extracts at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
For the special case where the single-dimensional distributions satisfy the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition 6 , Cai and Huang [7] gave a PTAS for the revenue maximizing auction. En route to obtaining their computational result, they prove the following structural lemma, which holds even for heterogeneous buyers. 99% of the optimal revenue can be obtained by one of the following simple mechanisms: (i) selling every item separately; or (ii) selling all but a constant number of items via a VCG-like mechanism. In other words, they show that when the single-dimensional distributions satisfy the MHR condition, no additional buyers are necessary to obtain 99% of the optimal revenue with mechanisms that are simple (in the above sense). Moreover, inspired by [5] , they show that for MHR distributions, when the number of buyers is larger than some constant, selling items separately obtains 99% of the social welfare. (In contrast, note that for regular distributions the ratio of social welfare to revenue may be unbounded, even when adding any number of buyers.)
Organization
In Section 2 we provide a succinct overview of the techniques for all our results. Model definitions and other preliminaries appear in Section 3. An abridged version of the proof of Theorem 1.2 appears in the following two sections: Section 4 deals with the regime where the number of items is greater than the number of buyers, whereas the regime of more buyers than items is considered in Section 5. The full version of this paper with detailed proofs of all theorems is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02908.
OVERVIEW OF PROOFS
Our techniques build upon the now-standard approach for approximately optimal revenue analysis: Separately reason about revenue contribution from rare events of extremely high value ("tail" events), and revenue contribution from lower values ("core" events). This approach is made formal via the core-tail decomposition framework of Li and Yao [27] . Separation between core and tail events is done by setting a cutoff for each item, and then proving a "core-tail decomposition" lemma that upper bounds the optimal revenue by the sum of total value from core events in which items are below their cutoffs (a.k.a. contribution from the core), and the total revenue from tail events in which items are above their cutoffs (a.k.a. contribution from the tail).
For approximation results, the next step would typically be to show that simple mechanisms approximate both the contribution from the core and the tail, hence the best simple mechanism approximates the optimal revenue. However, when targeting 99% of the optimal revenue, even if one shows that simple mechanisms fully recover the contribution from the core and the tail, it does not yet imply that simple mechanisms recover the sum of the contributions. Hence this approach alone cannot yield better than a 1/2-approximation. Instead, we carefully set the cutoffs so that the contribution from the core is almost fully recovered using simple mechanisms with either O (1) buyers (Theorems 1.3 and 1.5) or O (log m) buyers (Theorem 1.2), and the contribution from the tail is only a tiny fraction of the revenue from simple mechanisms with O (1) buyers 7 .
Before delving into the specificities of each result, we provide a few general notes about the tail and the core.
Tail. Since tail events are rare, they are approximately "separable" across items and across buyers. First, since the probability of two or more items in the tail of any buyer is low, the revenue contribution from tail items is roughly "separable" across items, i.e., approximating revenue contribution of tail events by the revenue contribution from selling items separately loses only a moderate factor. 6 Roughly speaking, MHR distribution (a special case of regular distributions) has a tail that is thinner than that of an exponential distribution. 7 In other words, for heavy-tailed distributions, adding a few buyers increases the revenue by a lot. Furthermore, each buyer is likely to have tail valuations for disjoint subsets of items ("separability across buyers"). Thus in an enhanced competition setting with more buyers we can simultaneously serve all of them, quickly increasing the revenue.
Core. Since the value of core items is bounded, a concentration bound typically suggests a nearoptimal grand bundle price whenever the sum of item values is significantly larger than the revenue from selling items separately.
In what follows we elaborate on cases where interesting artifacts arise in the analysis. We use Rev, SRev, and BRev to denote the optimal revenue from any mechanism, the optimal revenue from selling each item separately, and the optimal revenue from selling the grand bundle, respectively. 8 Theorem 1.3 (max{SRev, BRev}). An optimistic approach for proving Theorem 1.3 would use the same cutoff for all items, and apply a concentration bound (Chebyshev's inequality) to suggest a bundle price that almost fully recovers the contribution from the core with constant probability, then improve this probability to almost 1 by considering additional buyers. Unfortunately, such strong concentration does not hold in general: a small number of items may still exhibit a large variance, even inside the core. To overcome this challenge, we separate the set of items to items that exceed their cutoffs with constant probability, which we call "high items", and the remaining we call "low items". We then use a concentration bound only for the sum of low items to get a good bundle price for the low items. We set the cutoff so that the number of high items is a constant, hence with probability close to 1, one of our additional O (1) buyers simultaneously exceeds the cutoff of all the "high items". We conclude that BRev with O (1) buyers recovers almost all of the contribution from the core with probability almost 1.
Theorem 1.5 (BRev, regular distributions). Single dimensional regular distributions are appealing since they have a "small tail" property. While the grand bundle distribution need not be regular even when the individual item distributions are, we show that the underlying regularity of the individual items still maintains some well behaved properties that we can exploit. Specifically, we can set cutoffs so that in the resulting core-tail decomposition, the contribution from the tail is significantly smaller than the contribution from the core. This is important since we are only allowed to sell the grand bundle, while the tail is typically covered by selling items separately.
It is now left to guarantee that the core is almost fully recovered. The challenge is that a small number of outlier items may have very large variance, ruining the naive concentration bound argument. (In Theorem 1.3 we sometimes sold the outliers separately, but here we are only allowed to sell the grand bundle.) We show that given a large (but still constant) number of additional buyers, two of them are likely to have high values simultaneously for all of the outlier items. We can then use a concentration bound to suggest a good price for the remaining items, so that VCG on the grand bundle gives high revenue.
Instead of a concentration bound for the grand bundle (which is irrelevant when considering SRev) we further separate the contribution from the core to the contributions from lower and higher values. We then show that the contributions of lower values to the core can be almost fully recovered with probability almost 1 by SRev with O (n · log(m/n)) buyers, while the contributions of higher values to the core form only a tiny fraction of the revenue that can be extracted by SRev with O (n · log(m/n)) buyers. The proof appears in Section 4.
We show that selling each item separately achieves 99% of the optimal auction without adding any buyers at all. Proving this result requires yet new ideas. The intuition is simple: with so many buyers, we can afford to set the cutoff much higher -so high that most buyers have at most one item in the tail -while the contribution from the core can be almost fully recovered by selling each item to a tiny fraction of the buyers. Therefore, we can set aside a small subset of special buyers, and offer the items at high (tail) prices to all other buyers; we can then recover the rest of the revenue by auctioning the items not previously sold to the special buyers. (Note that this mechanism is for analysis purposes only -once we establish guarantees for any mechanism for selling items separately, we can use Myerson's optimal mechanism for selling items separately.) This part of the analysis also takes into account the probability that an item was sold in tail events.
Formalizing the above intuition is quite subtle. With high probability, there are still some buyers with multiple items in the tail -and each of those items has many other buyers whose valuations are in the tail, etc. Thus even after the core-tail decomposition, we have to reason about a multiple buyer, multiple item setting. To cope with this difficulty, we consider a bipartite graph of buyers and items, where we draw an edge {i, j} whenever buyer i's value of item j is in the tail. We then argue that we can analyze the revenue from each connected component separately. In particular, while there are, w.h.p., large components in the graph (with ω (1) buyers and items), we use simple ideas from percolation theory to bound the expected size of each connected component. The proof appears in Section 5.
MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a setting in which a monopolist seller sells a set [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m} of heterogeneous items to n additive buyers. Buyer i's value is additive if there exist values v i 1 , . . . , v i m such that buyer i's value for a set of items A is j ∈A v i j . The seller does not know the buyers' values, but knows the distribution from which they are sampled. For every item j, the value of each agent i for item j is independently sampled from a single-dimensional distribution D j .
A mechanism is given by a pair of an allocation function π , and a payment function p. The mechanism receives a valuation profile v = {v i j } i, j as input. Based on v, the allocation function determines the (possibly random) allocation of items to buyers, and the payment function determines the payment p i of every buyer i. Buyers are quasi-linear; namely, buyer i's utility from a mechanism that allocates her each item j with probability π i j and charges her a payment p i is j π i j · v i j − p i . A mechanism is Bayesian Individually Rational (BIR) if every buyer's expected utility (over the randomness of the mechanism and other buyers' values, assuming they are drawn from × j D j ) is non-negative. A mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if every buyer's expected utility is maximized when the buyer reports her valuation truthfully. Throughout the paper, a BIR-BIC mechanism is termed a truthful mechanism. The expected revenue of a truthful mechanism is E i p i (v) , where for every buyer i and item j buyer i's value for item j is drawn independently from D j . The optimal revenue is the optimal 9 expected revenue among all truthful mechanisms.
For any single dimensional distribution D and any q ∈ [0, 1], we assume w.l.o.g. that there exists
When the distribution is continuous this is true by the intermediate value theorem. When the distribution has point masses, we can smooth it with an infinitesimal perturbation; see e.g., [34] for a formal discussion. We note that when D is regular, the perturbed distribution may not be regular. However, it will not be hard to see that our proof in Section ?? will also work with distributions that are infinitesimally-close to regular distributions.
For a set of items
, and more generally, for a set S ⊆
Therefore, in a setting with n i.i.d. buyers, each drawn from D, the prior distribution is D n 10 .
Let M be a truthful mechanism with an allocation function π and a payment function p, i.e., given the submitted bids v, each buyer i is allocated item j with probability π i j (v) and pays p i (v). Let Rev M (·) be mechanism M's expected revenue, e.g.,
. Let Rev(·) be the optimal expected revenue by any truthful mechanism, e.g., Rev(D h ) is the optimal expected revenue by any truthful mechanism for h i.i.d. buyers drawn from D. Similarly, SRev(·) is the optimal expected revenue when selling the items separately, and BRev(·) is the optimal expected revenue when selling all items in a bundle. Let Val(·) be the expected value of the optimal allocation. Since we consider additive, independently drawn buyers,
For a single dimensional distribution D, and a number p ∈ [0, 1], let Rev p (·) denote the revenue of an optimal mechanism, among all truthful mechanisms that sell with ex-ante probability of at most p, i.e., mechanisms with allocation function π that satisfies Ev i π i (v) ≤ p.
Throughout the analysis, for h that is not an integer, we slightly abuse notation and use, e.g., D h instead of D ⌈h ⌉ to denote the product distribution × i ∈ ⌈h ⌉ D. For a random variable X drawn from distribution D, we use Rev(X ) and Rev(D) interchangeably (and similarly for SRev, BRev, etc.). Also, let I [E] be the indicator random variable that equals 1 when event E occurs, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we will use the following previously shown lemma.
Lemma 3.1.
[1] For any nm dimensional distribution D, Rev(D) ≤ n · m · SRev(D).
Lemmas for single dimensional distributions.
We recall and develop tools for our analysis in the remaining sections. Let v be drawn from a single dimensional distribution D (i.e., v ← D), and consider some cutoff T ∈ R.
Let Var(D) denote the variance of D. The following lemma shows that for δ > 0 that is not too small, the optimal revenue from ⌈1/δ ⌉ i.i.d. buyers drawn from D is at least a 1/(2δ ) factor larger than the optimal revenue that can be extracted from a buyer with value distributed according to v · I [v > T ]. This lemma will be used to bound the contribution (both to the core and tail) of higher values.
The following lemma will be used to cover the contribution of values from the core.
10 By D n we mean the product distribution × i ∈[n] D.
The following lemma is a specified analog to Lemma 3.6 that bounds the contribution from values in the core using the second price auction, and its proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.6. Let Rev VCG denote the revenue from the second price auction.
For ease of exposition, we assume D has a density f and is strictly increasing. Nevertheless, our results extend to arbitrary regular distributions.
Our analysis is done in quantile space, which is defined below. •
i.e., the revenue from the posted price V (q) that sells w.p. 1 − q.
Observe that V is increasing in q. By change of variables, the expected value v can be computed as follows: 11 
The following lemma is a well known characterization of regular distributions. 
The following corollary is the only way we use regularity (and is only used to prove Lemma 3.11).
The following lemma shows that if the probability of exceeding the cutoff T is ε, then T is a price that provides a 1 − ε approximation to the optimal revenue from the random variable v · I [v > T ].
The following lemma relates the contribution from the core to the contribution from the tail. Lemma 3.12. For a cutoff T = V (1 − ε 1 ), for every 0 < ε 2 < 1 and k ∈ N such that ε 1 · ε −k 2 < 1 it holds that:
Mechanisms with restricted probability of sale. We describe optimal single item mechanisms with restricted probability of sale. The lemmas established in this section are used in Section 5. In particular, we formally show that a naive generalization of Myerson's optimal auction for the unrestricted case is also optimal for the restricted case.
Fix a number p ∈ [0, 1] and x i.i.d. buyers, each buyer i with value v i drawn from a single dimensional distribution D. A mechanism with allocation function π that satisfies Ev i ∈[x ] π i (v) ≤ p, is said to sell with ex-ante probability of at most p.
Recall that by Myerson's theory, a mechanism with allocation rule π and payment p is truthful if and only if each buyer i's allocation rule π i is monotone, and buyer i's payment function is fully determined by π i via the equality p 
A regular distribution is a distribution whose corresponding virtual value function φ is monotone. For irregular distributions, Myerson defines yet another transformation that transforms the virtual value function to an ironed virtual value functionφ (the details are not so important for our application; for more details see e.g., [24, 30] ). The key point is that ironed virtual value functions are always monotone, and furthermore, maintain the following property: 
In order to construct the optimal mechanism with restricted probability of sale, we will need the following definitions.
Note that if ϕ ∈ S, then it must be that ϕ = 0 or that Pr[φ(v * ) ≥ ϕ] = p. 13 Otherwise, it must be that Pr
Consider the mechanism M that sells a single item to x buyers as follows. If ϕ ∈ S, the mechanism allocates the item to a random buyer i among those withφ(v i ) =φ(v * ) wheneverφ(v * ) ≥ ϕ, and otherwise does not allocate.
If ϕ S, then the mechanism allocates the item to a random buyer i among those withφ(v i ) = φ(v * ) wheneverφ(v * ) > ϕ, and wheneverφ(v * ) = ϕ the mechanism draws a Bernoulli random variable that equals 1 w.p.
, and if the variable equals 1 the mechanism allocates to a random buyer i among those withφ(v i ) = ϕ. Lemma 3.15. For x i.i.d. buyers drawn from a single dimensional distribution D, and p, ϕ, v * as above, the mechanism M described above sells with ex-ante probability of at most p, and extracts expected revenue of:
Moreover, every buyer contributes the same amount of expected revenue.
We will now prove the optimality of M among mechanisms with restricted probability of sale. Lemma 3.16. For D, x, p as above, the mechanism M above is a revenue maximizing mechanism among all truthful mechanisms that sell to x i.i.d. buyers drawn from D with ex-ante probability of at most p, i.e., Rev p (D x ) = Rev M (D x ). 
Partition of the support.
Recall that for every buyer i and item j, v i j ← D j , and that D = × j ∈[m] D j . Every item j is assigned a cutoff T j . If the value of an item is greater than its cutoff (i.e., v i j > T j ) then it is said to be in the tail w.r.t. v i , and otherwise it is in the core w.r.t v i . 13 Otherwise Pr[φ (v * ) ≥ ϕ] = p − ϵ but for every 0 < a < ϕ we have Pr[ϕ >φ (v * ) ≥ a] > ϵ . 14 For a set of items A, let D A be the distribution D conditioned on A being exactly the set of items in the tail. Let p A be the probability of A being exactly the set of items in the tail, i.e.,
Let D A C (resp., D A T ) be the distribution D A restricted to just items in the core (resp., tail).
For every buyer i consider some A i ⊆ [m], and let A = {A i } i ∈[n] . Let A represent the event that for every i it holds that A i is exactly the set of items that are in the tail with respect to buyer i's valuation, i.e., for every item j ∈ A i it holds that v i j > T j , and for every j A i it holds that v i j ≤ T j . Denote by p A the probability of event A, i.e., p A = i p A i , and let D A be the distribution D n conditioned on the event A, i.e., D A = × i ∈[n] D A i . The following lemma appeared previously and is included for completeness. BUYERS In this section we prove that for m ≫ n, increasing the number of buyers by a factor of O (log(m/n)) suffices to recover 99% of the optimal revenue by selling the items separately. 
This implies the following corollary for the special case of a single buyer: 
Proof outline
We first partition the domain of the valuations distribution into sub-domains (using the Subdomain Stiching Lemma (Lemma 3.20)). We henceforth condition on the event (or sub-domain) A that describes which items are in the tail or core for which buyer (we still don't know their values within the tail/core).
We now describe a "marginal mechanism lemma" (Lemma 4.3) that shows that the optimal revenue from D A , is bounded by the sum of expected item values in the core in event A, plus the revenue from selling to each buyer the items that are in her tail in event A (conditioned on them being in the tail). This implies a core-tail decomposition lemma (Lemma 4.4) that bounds the optimal revenue using two terms: the core and tail.
We bound the tail in Section 4.3. In Lemma 4.5 we show that the tail is bounded by the revenue from selling items separately and using only prices that are higher than the cutoffs. Since the probability that two buyers are interested in the same item at a high price is extremely low, the supply constraint is hardly restricting. Therefore when we increase the number of buyers, the revenue increases almost linearly. This is used in Lemma 4.6 that shows that the tail is a tiny fraction of the revenue after multiplying the number of buyers by a (large) constant.
We bound the core in Section 4.4. We separate the core into regions of lower values and higher values. Lower values are upper bounded by a maximum of two cutoffs, and are handled in two lemmata (4.7 and 4.8).
In Lemma 4.10 we bound the contribution from "higher" values (still in the core). First, we observe that they lie in a bounded region: bounded from above since they are in the core, and bounded from below since we handle low values separately. We use this property to show that their expected value is at most O (log(m/n))-factor larger than the revenue from selling each item separately at "higher" prices. Now, similarly to the tail, since at high prices buyers are likely to want disjoint sets of items, the above revenue scales almost linearly when increasing the number of buyers. Therefore, multiplying the number of buyers by O (log(m/n)) suffices to extract revenue much larger than the contribution from high values.
Finally, we complete the proof by combining the core-tail decomposition with the above arguments.
Core-tail decomposition.
The following lemma may be seen as a generalization of Lemma 24 in [21] for n > 1 buyers. In [21] , the authors note that the proof of their Lemma 24 implies a generalization for n > 1, by considering for each item the maximal value among all buyers' values. This method still allows to partition the support of D n to only 2 m subsets (according to the set of items that have a maximal value above the cutoff). We show a more fine-grained generalization that partitions the support of D n to 2 m ·n subsets, thereby leading to a tighter analysis.
Recall that for some A i , D A i T is the distribution D conditioned on A i being exactly the set of items in the tail, restricted only to the items in the tail (A i ). 
The following core-tail decomposition upper bounds the optimal revenue from n buyers. In contrast to the decomposition in [1] , our decomposition provides a tail that relates to single buyer settings.
To simplify notation, once cutoffs T j are fixed for every j, we use D Tail to denote the product distribution of the random variables {v j · I[v j > T j ]} j ∈[m] , and D Core to denote the product distribution of the random variables {v j · I[v j ≤ T j ]} j ∈[m] , where v j ← D j for every j. Cutoff setting. For every item j fix T j to be so that Pr v j ←D j [v j > T j ] = m −1 .
Tail
The main lemma of this section is Lemma 4.6 which states that the contribution from the tail is a tiny fraction of the revenue from SRev with n · C buyers where C is some constant. Lemma 4.5 shows (in the spirit of Proposition 1 in [1] ) that we can approximately recover the tail of one buyer ( A⊆[m] p A · Rev(D A T )) by selling items separately, only using prices that are higher than the cutoffs. Recall that D Tail is the product distribution of the random variables {v j · I[v j > T j ]} j ∈[m] , and therefore SRev(
Combining the above lemma with Lemma 3.5 shows that SRev with n · C buyers (where C is a constant) extracts much more revenue than the contribution from the tail. 
Core
For ease of exposition, let v * j denote the random variable v *
. In this section we upper bound the core Val(D n
Cutoff setting in the core. Fix some constant ε 1 ≤ 1. For each item j, set T ′ j so that Pr v←D j [v > T ′ j ] = ε 1 n ·log m n , and set T ′′ j = max{ n m · T j , T ′ j }. In order to bound the contribution from the core, for each item we separate to "tiny values" (at most n m T j ), "low values" (at most T ′ j ), and "higher values" (above max{ n m · T j , T ′ j }). In the following we bound the contribution from values that are at most T ′′ j . In Lemma 4.7 we show that "tiny values" contribute a tiny fraction of the revenue that is achievable by increasing the number of buyers by a constant factor, and in Lemma 4.8 we show that the contribution of "lower values" to the core can be almost completely covered by the revenue that is achievable by increasing the number of buyers by a factor of O (log m n ). 
Putting Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 gives the following corollary
Lemma 4.10 shows that "higher values" in the core contribute a tiny fraction of the revenue that is achievable by increasing the number of buyers by a factor of O (log m n ). We are now ready to bound the contribution from the core. Let ε 2 be so that 1 + ε 2 = (1 − e − ε 1 δ ) −1 .
Lemma 4.11. Let 2n/m ≤ δ ≤ min{1/2, ε 1 }. Then, Val(D n Core ) ≤ (1 + ε 2 + 8 · ε 1 ) · SRev(D n·log m n δ ).
Matching Lower Bound for Many Items
Theorem 4.12. Let m = Ω(n). There exists a distribution D so that for every ε > 0 there exists some δ > 0 so that
Proof sketch: Each item is drawn from the equal revenue (ER) distribution on the support [1, m] . Let ER = × j ∈[m] ER. One can easily show that SRev(ER δ ·n ·ln( m n ) ) ≤ δ · m · n · ln m n . Therefore, it suffices to show a mechanism that achieves revenue of Ω(m · n · ln m n ). Consider the mechanism that orders the buyers (arbitrarily), and offers each buyer in her turn to purchase her favorite bundle of size m 4·n at price m 8 · ln m n . As m n grows to a large enough constant, one can show that for every buyer w.h.p. there are at least m 4n items valued above n. Conditioned on that event, the expected value of the sum of these items is at least m 4 · ln m n . Also, w.h.p. every buyer will purchase a bundle (observe that there are always enough items), thus extracting revenue of n ·m 8 · ln m n , w.h.p., as required.
MANY BUYERS: SRev WITH NO ADDITIONAL BUYERS
In this section we show that adding more buyers is not required for a number of buyers n that is sufficiently larger than the number of items m. Specifically, we prove the following theorem: 
Proof outline (a tale of three tails)
We first partition the domain of the valuation distributions into sub-domains, using the Subdomain Stiching Lemma (Lemma 3.20). In our analysis, we condition on the event (or sub-domain) A that describes which items are in the tail or core for which buyer (we still don't know their values within the tail/core). For each event we define a bipartite graph with buyer-nodes [n] and item-nodes [m], where an edge {i, j} between buyer i and item j exists if and only if item j is in buyer i's tail. Crucially, the revenue is separable across connected components (because in different connected components, disjoint sets of buyers are interested in disjoint sets of items). We now establish a "marginal mechanism lemma" (Lemma 5.2) that shows that the optimal revenue from D A is bounded from above by the sum of expected item values in the core in event A, plus the revenue from selling items in each connected component to the buyers in that connected component (conditioned on them being in the tail).
For a connected component that contains only one item (i.e., the buyers in this connected component have only this item in their tails), the lemma provides an even tighter bound. Namely, we can restrict attention to mechanisms that sell the item to buyers in the connected component with probability at most p, where p is the upper bound on the ex-ante probability that the optimal mechanism (for event A) sells this item. Then, with probability 1 − p we can resell the item to other buyers. Essentially, this means that we can use most buyers and some items to (almost) recover the contribution from the tail, and then use the rest of the buyers and items to (almost) recover the contribution from the core. Note that while we partition the buyers in advance, the partitioning of the items is only done after seeing which items are bought by the first subset of buyers. Note also that the mechanism of partitioning the buyers is for analysis purpose only: once we establish that it achieves a good revenue by selling each item separately, we can only improve the revenue by running Myerson's optimal mechanism.
Since we consider a setting with many buyers, the expected number of buyers that have a specific item in their tail (henceforth termed interested buyers) is concentrated. This implies a core-tail decomposition lemma (Lemma 5.3) that bounds the optimal revenue using four terms: one core, and three tails. The three tails are (1) the contribution from selling item j whenever the number of interested buyers does not exceed the expected number of interested buyers by much, (2) the contribution from selling item j whenever the number of interested buyers does exceed the expected number of interested buyers by a significant constant, and (3) the contribution from selling items in connected components with at least two items.
We bound the three tails in Section 5.4. In Lemma 5.5 we show that the first tail is almost completely recovered by the revenue from selling items separately to all but a small fraction of the buyers, and restricting the ex-ante probability of sale as described above. Note that the tail is not fully recovered, but this is a sufficient guarantee due to the probability of sale restriction (see above). In particular, the items can be resold to other buyers with sufficiently high probability.
In Lemma 5.6 we show that the second tail is a tiny fraction of the revenue from selling items separately. This is done by arguing that the event where the number of interested buyers significantly exceeds the expectation is extremely rare.
In Lemma 5.9 we show that the third tail is also a tiny fraction of the revenue from selling items separately. This part is more involved, since we need to bound the expected size of a connected component, as well as some of the higher moments. Here we use some simple ideas from percolation theory. See Section 5.4.1 for details. Finally, we conclude the proof in Section 5.5 by integrating the above arguments into the core-tail decomposition.
The item-buyer bipartite graph
We adopt all the notation from Section 3.2, and introduce some more notation. For a single dimensional distribution v ← D and cutoff T , letD denote the distribution of v |v > T . Fix 
Core-tail decomposition.
We introduce a new "marginal mechanism" lemma (Lemma 5.2) that is suitable for the case n ≫ m. Fix some A as in Section 3.2, and let M be an optimal mechanism w.r.t. D A , i.e., Rev M (D A ) = Rev(D A ). Let π be the mechanism's allocation function, and letπ
Recall that for a connected component X ∈ P A , X n = X ∩ [n] and similarly X m = X ∩ [m]. Also, recall that given v ← D j , we useD j to denote the distribution of v |v > T j . Lemma 5.2. (Marginal Mechanism on Sub-Domain) Fix A, and letπ be as above. Let P A 2 be all the connected components X in P A so that |X m | ≥ 2. Then
I.e., the revenue from D A is bounded by the revenue from selling items separately, each item j to |A[j]| buyers in the tail atπ j ex-ante probability of sale, plus the contribution to the core (T j · (1 −π j )), plus the revenue from connected components with more than one item.
One can show that for fixed item j, cutoff T j , and δ = 2 · Pr v←D j [v > T j ], for any k ≤ 1/δ : Rev(D k j ) ≤ 4 ·k · Rev(D 1/δ j ), (see full version for details). This in turns allows to show the following core-tail decomposition, Lemma 5.3. (Core-tail decomposition) For cutoffs T j so that Pr v←D j v > T j ≥ 1 2n , and a cutoff T *
Rev D n j · E X j m · X j n 2 · I[ X j m ≥ 2] Tail 3
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Cutoff setting. Fix some 0 < ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 , ε 4 < 1. Throughout this section, for every item j fix T j to be the value for which Pr v←D j v > T j = 1 n ·ε 1 . Clearly the expected number of buyers that have item j in their tail is 1 ε 1 . We set T * = (1+ε 2 ) ε 1 , i.e., we use ε 2 as a deviation from this expected size. We will first sell items separately at high prices to a 1 − ε 4 fraction of the buyers. In this case the expected number of buyers that have item j in their tail is 1−ε 4 ε 1 . We will use ε 3 as a deviation from this expected size.
Whenever an item j is not sold to one of the 1 − ε 4 fraction of the buyers, we will sell the item to one of the remaining ε 4 buyers at price T j . This will suffice to to almost fully recover the contribution from the core. The following lemma essentially combines Lemma 3.19 with a concentration bound, to show that Tail 1 can be almost fully recovered by selling items separately to a 1 − ε 4 fraction of the buyers. Let ε 5 = ε 5 (ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 4 , ε 3 ) be so that 1 + ε 5 = . It is only important to note that ε 5 → 0 as ε 1 → 0. The following lemmas ultimately show that the coefficient of SRev(D n ) in Tail 3 tends to 0 as as ε 1 tends to 0. This will be proved in Lemma 5.9. We will develop the proof in steps. Recall that for a connected component X ∈ P A , X n = X ∩ [n] and X m = X ∩ [m]. Lemma 5.7 upper bounds the term we wish to bound into two terms. Note that in both terms, at a loss of a constant factor, we free ourself from the dependence on the number of buyers that have at most one item in their tail (and are in j's connected component). Lemma 5.7. For every A, let S ⊆ [n] denote the buyers i with at least two items in their tail, i.e., A[i] ≥ 2. For every item j, letÎ = I[ X j m ≥ 2], then
Clearly, showing that E X j m + X j n ∩ S 3 is small implies that E X j m is small. For every j it holds that E X j m ≤ 1 1− m n·ε 2 1 (this follows from simple ideas from percolation theory, see full version for details). Similar techniques can be used to prove Lemma 5.8. · I X j m ≥ 2 ≤ ε 7
Proof of Theorem 5.1
Combine the core-tail decomposition (Lemma 5.3) with Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.5 with p =π j , Lemma 5.6, and Lemma 5.9 to get:
Rev D n j Consider a seller that sells the items separately. Each item j is first auctioned to (1 − ε 4 ) · n buyers using an optimal mechanism with restricted ex-ante probability of sale ofπ j . Whenever the mechanism does not allocate the item, the seller proceeds and sells the item to the remaining ε 4 · n buyers optimally. Clearly, the revenue of the suggested mechanism is at least 15 Revπ j (D (1−ε 4 ) ·n j ) + Rev(D ε 4 ·n j ) · (1 −π j ). The above mechanism, by definition, does not make more than Rev(D n j ) revenue, hence, Rev (D n ) ≤ (max{(1 − e −ε 4 /ε 1 ) −1 , (1 + ε 5 )} + 4 · (ε 6 + ε 7 )) · j ∈[m] Rev(D n j ) As required.
